This morning, the committee will hear testimony

on the United States strategy for managing relations with Russia.

Over the last 7 years, Russia has, in my view, slipped into a mire

of authoritarianism, corruption, and manufactured belligerence.

These developments, along with many serious domestic problems,

have been partly masked by an extraordinary oil and gas windfall.

But these resources are not solving Russia’s public health and demographic

crisis, they aren’t being used to modernize Russia’s

aging oil and gas infrastructure, and they aren’t bringing peace to

the North Caucasus. Instead, we’ve seen a spread of rampant corruption,

Kremlin efforts to muzzle dissent and bully neighbors, and

a fixation on acquiring pipelines to deliver hydrocarbons to our close allies.

In view of these stark realities, and the Kremlin’s charged rhetoric

about the United States, the most important conclusion.0. we

can draw about our strategy for dealing with Russia is that we

need a new one. Whatever our game plan has been—and I am not

convinced we’ve had one—it clearly isn’t working.

Russia is very important to the United States in at least three respects:

First, we have an interest in the country’s domestic situation, including

the security of its nuclear stockpiles. Contrary to what Russian

media might say, the United States needs a Russia that’s

strong and stable. Russia is the only other State in the world with

enough nuclear weapons and delivery capacity to wipe us out. We

can’t afford to see its government crippled by corruption and lack

of accountability. Beyond that, Russia’s domestic problems, especially

its looming democratic implosion, could become a source of

significant instability in the world. Russia is losing the a population

equivalent to the size of the State of Delaware—almost 1

million people each year. Its population could be cut in half by the

year 2050. No country—no country—can endure that type of loss

indefinitely without serious consequences.

Second, we have an interest in Russia’s neighborhood. Many

countries in Eastern Europe and along Russia’s border occupy positions

of significant strategic and political importance. They rely on

Russia for energy, and trust that it won’t abuse its size and resources

like a playground bully. We must respond to Russia’s actions

that destabilize the country’s neighbors or undermine the region’s

young democracies.

Third, by virtue of its permanent seat on the United States Security

Council and the size of its territory, population, and economy,

Russia remains a significant strategic player, with the ability to affect

many of our global interests. We’ve seen this recently, in

Kosovo. There, as in numerous other cases, Russia’s influence has

not been helpful.

For years, the Bush administration tried to paper over problems

with Russia. More recently, the State Department has said it will

work with the Kremlin when possible, and push back when necessary.

This formula sounds reasonable, but I worry that it provides

neither the strategic vision nor the practical framework to

deal with a Kremlin that has repeatedly and successfully outmaneuvered

the West in recent years.

Mr. Putin has successfully exploited the differences in the

Euroatlantic community for the past several years. But with new

leadership in several of our key European capitals, it is time to

forge a new common strategy for dealing with Russia.

When the United States and Europe come together around a single

cogent policy, we have a long and successful track record for

managing relations with Moscow. A joint United States-European

approach would not, and should not, constitute a threat to Russia.

Indeed, I believe the principal goal of such an effort should be to

refocus the Kremlin on all that Russia stands to gain from working

with the West, and all it stands to lose by sticking to its zero-sum

mentality that it seems to be gripped by now.

The West needs to offer a clear vision of the positive role Russia

could and should play as a leader in the international community.

We need to devise incentives that will recognize and reward Moscow’s

efforts to deal responsibly with the many common challenges

we face. Conversely, if Russian leaders continue pursuing zero-sum

diplomacy, then it’s time we address the issue together with our allies.

I look forward to our discussion on these and many other questions,

and I hope it will yield ideas for how to manage this critical

relationship in the future. I now yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar.

Thank you, Senator.

With the indulgence of my colleagues, I would like to do two

things. One, I would like to make an additional brief statement, 2

minutes, and we’ll have 7-minute rounds.

Let me emphasize, Mr. Secretary, what Senator Lugar said. I

think there’s a dangerous drift in the way in which we deal with

the notion of strategic weapons. The lack of regard on the part of

this administration for the Moscow Treaty is frightening. It is my

understanding that START is set to expire. The next President of

the United States is going to have less than a year to have to deal

with this. And what I see is counterproductive actions on the part

of this administration. Moscow appears to be willing to reduce the

number of strategic nuclear warheads below the Moscow Treaty

levels, limit systems, as well as warheads, and is looking for

verifiability and transparency. I hope what I’m hearing about the

administration’s attitude toward this is incorrect.

Second—and I want to reemphasize—this Nation owes Senator

Lugar an incredible debt, along with Senator Nunn. There are 700

to 1,400 tons of highly enriched uranium in Russia—700 to 1,400.

We’re talking about worrying about Iran having 3,000 centrifuges

running for a year, getting 25 kilograms—we’re talking about going

to war over 25 kilograms—that that’s what these centrifuges could

produce in a year if they run. And you’ve got 700 to 1,400 tons of

highly enriched uranium, over 100 tons of plutonium. And, according

to Russian security officials, only about 30 percent of that

amount of material is secured.

So, we’ve got a lot to talk about, Mr. Secretary. But let me also

state, at the outset, I have great respect for you. You’ve served in

administrations, and you know a lot about this subject. We’re

thankful that you’re prepared to come before the committee.

And I will now yield for your testimony, and then we’ll go to

questioning. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. I’m sure all of us have

many questions, but we’ll stick to 7 minutes on a first round.

I have made no secret of the fact that I find the two witnesses

we’re going to have on our next panel two of the most insightful

foreign-policy analysts of this generation, and I find myself in

agreement with Mr. Brzezinski—and I’m going to unfairly and—

characterize, summarize what I think is one of the elements of his

argument. I’d like you to respond. He suggests, in the paper he

submitted, that there is a new elite that’s emerged in Russia, that

Putin has surrounded himself with former KGB operatives in—

from, sort of, top to bottom.

And this new elite has embraced a—for a lot of reasons, some of

which you referenced—a strident nationalism as a substitute for

communism, and that the United States has been largely silent, in

response to many of the actions that Russia is taking—because of

our loss of legitimacy, with Guantanamo, and because of our inaccuracy

about the war in Iraq. Our power has been viewed in diminished

terms, because of us being tied down in Iraq. And that has

produced a heightened need for us to seek Russia’s support in, for

example, Korea and Iran, where we otherwise would not have

needed that much support. That has emboldened Russia to act with

impunity in its geopolitical backyard—Georgia, Ukraine, Estonia,

Lithuania, Central Asia.

How do you respond to that broad assertion? Has our being tied

down in Iraq, our conduct of our war on terror, put us in the position

where we have diminished capacity to deal with Russia’s aberrations under Putin?

But has it limited our efficacy when we’ve spoken?

OK. I have a number of specific questions I’ll submit for the record.

But I’m trying to get a sense of the sort of factual

basis that is the predicate for United States determinations

relative to how to respond to these differences we have with Russia,

and how we view the present circumstances of the Russian

Government and Russian people.

And three of the areas relate to the demographic collapse that I

referenced, where the World Bank says that the debilitating decline

in the Russian population is unprecedented among industrial

nations. Without studying the statistics or the bad jokes you hear

in the Kremlin, which are, you know—the jokes circulating in Moscow

asks, ‘‘What are the three most popular cars in Russia?’’ And

you know the answer: A Mercedes, BMW, and a hearse. And do we

start off with the proposition—with the premise that Russia does

have a demographic collapse on its hands that has to be dealt with?

Well, I have a number of other things I wanted

to get into, but let me conclude by asking, Would you characterize,

to the best of your knowledge, what the administration’s present

attitude is about extending and/or amending, or replacing, the

START Treaty, which is due to expire in December 2009?

Well, I hope that the administration can at least

give the next President the opportunity to deal with it by extending

START. I think it would be the single greatest negative legacy this

administration could leave, if it leaves us in a situation where

there is no future architecture to follow on to START. I think this

administration would be judged incredibly harshly by history if

they leave it undone, or unresolved by the time it leaves. I pray

to God that won’t be the case.

I yield the floor. I yield to my colleague Senator Lugar.

Thank you. Senator Hagel.

Senator Voinovich.

Thank you. Senator Feingold.

And I would now, because we’re very anxious to

hear what you have to say, turn to you, Dr. Brzezinski, by pointing

out, by the way, that you and I suffer from a similar fate; we have

children who are better than we are. Your daughter is incredible.

I don’t know whether you get a chance to watch her on television,

but she is—she’s tough, and she’s smart, you’ve trained her well.

My dad used to say, ‘‘The greatest satisfaction a parent can have

is to look at their children and know they had turned out better

than they did.’’ I think that can be said about you—as well as your sons.

But, at any rate, I welcome you, and the floor is yours, and, after

that, we’ll turn to you, General Scowcroft, and we’re anxious to

hear from you both.

Though it happens to be true.

Well, I’m known as Beau Biden’s father, in Delaware.

He’s the attorney general. So——

Would our next panel please be seated?

We are, indeed, fortunate to have two former National Security

Advisors, but, much, quite frankly, more consequential than that,

two men who, for the better part of the last two decades, have

played a major, major role in our foreign policy and strategic doctrine,

and two of the most outspoken and well-respected voices

from both a Republican and Democratic administration. And I welcome

you both.

With your permission, I’ll put your bios in the record, since

you’re probably two of the best-known folks in the foreign policy

field. And, without objection, I’d like to be able to do that.

Thank you very much. General Scowcroft.

Thank you very much.

Why don’t I yield to Senator Lugar to begin.

Thank you. Senator Hagel.

Thank you.

Gentlemen, I’d like to pursue what we’ve been talking about the

last few minutes. To the extent that it matters, I share your view

that, generationally, there’s reason for optimism, that we’re—in the

next, whether it’s 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, there is likely—there

is a greater reason to be optimistic about developments internally

in Russia.

And you said, Zbig, that your present preoccupation—this was

the specific issues that affect our bilateral relationships now—if—

there’s only one thing I look at that makes me pessimistic about

the optimistic projection of a emerging generation educated in the

West—different perspective, not coming out of the security apparatus—

that worries me, and that is strategic doctrine, strategic relationship.

If we do not, during this period of transition, harness

and deal with what is a, I think, very worrisome strategic relationship

the next couple of years—that is, not as it relates to threatening

one another, but as it relates to the continued instability of

stored material—plutonium, highly enriched uranium—failure to

follow through on the Moscow treaty, losing an opportunity to move

toward significantly further reductions—that I don’t know how you

recapture that if it begins to erode.

I mean, you know, there’s a lot of things we can change. We can

change—almost by treaty, by discussion, by agreement—energy relationships.

We can change relationships as it relates to our economic

relationships, our—but I don’t know how you harness what

will become a very—a lost opportunity here, if something isn’t done

more concretely to promote this—what has, heretofore, been a progressively

better strategic—a—sort of a consensus on how to deal

with the existence of nuclear weapons and material, and cooperating

together to prevent further proliferation.

Could you talk to me a little bit about that dynamic? I mean, it

seems to me—Putin talked about it, it’s the positive part of his

speech—it seems to me that it raises and ups the ante on its importance.

It’s the one place we may be able to cooperate. And failure

to deal with it—because I see no—I’ve—I don’t detect any

sense—and Senator Lugar would be better prepared to speak to

this than I would, in his relationships with the administration—I

don’t detect any sense of urgency. As a matter of fact, I don’t detect

any sense of desire to maintain what is viewed as the old regime,

in terms of arms control, even improving it. So, that’s a little bit

of a rambling preamble to my question.

Could you guys discuss a little bit about strategic doctrine,

United States-Russian attempts to deal with proliferation—controlling,

reduction, et cetera?

Thank you very much. General.

Thank you very much.

I can’t resist the temptation, I’d like to ask one last question, if I may.

What should our policy be now, with regard to Iran, if you’re

willing to respond? I know that wasn’t part of the hearing, per se.

But it does affect the relationship. Are you—either of you—willing

to venture a response to that? I know that’s a essay question, but

how would you recommend, were you in your old positions, we proceed

on Iran now? And you can defer, you can demur, you can—

we can end the hearing, if you’d like, but I—if you——

Well, please.

I would like to hear your answer.

Thank you very much. General.

Thank you both. My one regret is, you’re both

not still in the Government. Thank you.